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Abstract This paper examines the pivotal role played by property markets in determining
the magnitude and distribution of welfare changes resulting from localised environmental
change. We address that issue using an equilibrium sorting model (ESM) calibrated, by
way of example, to the circumstances of a road infrastructure project in the English town of
Polegate. Previous ESM research has tended to assume that all households rent property from
a fixed property stock. The narrative that arises from those models concerns environmental
gentrification, wherein access to environmentally improved locations is appropriated by the
relatively wealthy through their ability to out-compete the less wealthy in the rental property
market. Our research shows that to be only part of a much more complex story. We develop a
model that extends the sophistication with which ESMs replicate property market dynamics,
allowing for households to choose whether to rent or purchase their home and introducing
greater realism into housing supply responses to changing market conditions. Our research
shows that propertymarkets redistribute welfare gains across the population in complex ways
in which tenure choice and housing supply constraints play central roles.
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1 Introduction
The environmental impacts of many projects and policies are highly localised. Consider as
examples, the creation of a wind farm, the siting of an incinerator plant, the closure of a
landfill site or, the project that motivates this paper, the construction of a bypass that directs
road traffic around rather than through a town. Until recently, typical appraisal practice
has been to assume that the merits of such projects could be measured by estimating the
welfare changes experienced by current residents of an impacted location. Over recent years,
researchers have expressed increasing concern that this assumption may be a poor reflection
of the true welfare outcomes (Goulder et al. 2003; Smith and Carbone 2007; Carbone and
Smith 2008; Bayer et al. 2009; Klaiber and Phaneuf 2010). At the root of those concerns is
the fact that the standard approach provides only a partial equilibrium analysis that ignores
potentially important behavioural responses to changing environmental quality. The purpose
of this paper is to explore perhaps the most significant of such responses, those that take
place through decisions made in the property market.
Following a tradition of research that dates back to Tiebout (1956), economists have
made significant progress in exploring behavioural responses mediated by property market
decisions (Sieg et al. 2004;Kerry Smith et al. 2004; Tra 2010;Klaiber and Phaneuf 2010). The
key tool in advancing that research effort has been the development of equilibrium sorting
models (ESMs) (Epple and Platt 1998; Bayer et al. 2004; Ferreyra 2007; Kuminoff et al.
2010). The basic structure of an ESM is to envisage a property market where households
choose a residential location from a finite set of neighbourhoods that differ with regards to
their level of provision of public goods (of which environmental quality is one element).
Equilibrium in the market is established through adjustments in property prices that match
supply with demand in each neighbourhood. Since ESMs are based on an explicit model
of household preferences, they provide a framework within which to consider the welfare
impacts of interventions that result in localised changes in public good provision (Smith et al.
2004; Sieg et al. 2004; Ferreyra 2007; Walsh 2007; Klaiber and Phaneuf 2010; Tra 2010).
Insomuch as ESMs explicitly allow for behavioural adjustments to those policy changes
through decisions in the property market, ESMs provide general equilibrium (GE) welfare
measures to contrast with the partial equilibrium (PE) measures used currently for project
appraisal (Sieg et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2004; Walsh 2007).
Over recent years the field of equilibrium sorting modelling has advanced significantly
along various fronts (Kuminoff et al. 2010), although certain characterisations of the property
market adopted by many ESMs remain highly simplistic. For example, it is standard practice
to assume that all households are renters and that the rents they pay leave the economy
under study, accruing to absentee landlords. Accordingly, ESMs tend to ignore the fact that
many households own their own homes and that some may also receive rental income as
landlords from their ownership of rental property. Moreover, the manner in which ESMs
handle housing supply involves considerable abstraction; houses are treated as bundles of
building-block-like homogenous quality units that, in response to property market changes,
can be costlessly repackaged to create new configurations of properties. The virtues of this
abstraction have been questioned previously in the literature (Epple and Platt 1998; Bayer
et al. 2004). We review these assumptions in detail in Sect. 2 of the paper.
Where ESMs have been used to explore the welfare outcomes of localised environmental
change, the reliance on these simplifying assumptions supports a particular story of property
market responses. For example, Banzhaf and Walsh (2004) and Sieg et al. (2004) show that
improvements in the environmental quality of a neighbourhood leads to environmental gen-
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trification; households currently renting properties in that neighbourhood find themselves
displaced by wealthier households more able to afford the increased rents. Consequently, an
environmental project that seems to offer hope of welfare gains to the less wealthy residents
of the improved area may actually condemn them to welfare losses since rising rents may
force them to take up residence in another, less-preferred neighbourhood. Careful consid-
eration reveals that that narrative rests quite heavily on the simplified representation of the
property market. For instance, in the real world many households own rather than rent their
homes. Indeed, for homeowners in an improved neighbourhood increasing property prices
are anything but a burden. As prices rise and their properties grow in value, such homeowners
realise capital gains which open up newwelfare-enhancing consumption opportunities either
within or outside the property market.
The central contribution of this paper is to present an ESM that allows us to relax a number
of the standard simplifying characterisations of the property market that have been used in
previous analyses and so examine the consequences of those assumptions forwelfare analysis.
In Sect. 3, we describe that model in detail. Drawing on the work of Binner and Day (2015),
we describe an ESM with tenure decisions allowing households the option of renting or
purchasing when choosing where to live. In addition we develop an alternative representation
of the housing supply function that better captures the realities of accommodating changing
populations in spatially limited neighbourhoods. In Sects. 4 and 5we explore the implications
of thesemodelling advances bymeans of a simulation analysis inwhich themodel is calibrated
to reflect the features of a real intervention; the construction of a bypass around the rural
town of Polegate in England.
The simulations reported in this paper provide a number of important insights. First, they
confirm that the magnitude and distribution of welfare effects predicted by a PE analysis
grossly misrepresent those identified by the GE analyses enabled by an ESM.What is clear is
that policy decisions that naively attempt to direct local public goods provision for the purpose
of achieving redistributive aims (as has been advocated in the environmental justice literature;
for example, Walker and Bickerstaff 2000; Liu 2000; Walker 1998; Walton and Shaw 2003;
Poustie 2014) may have unanticipated and potentially counter-productive outcomes. Second
they show that while environmental gentrification is part of the story of these GE responses
to local environmental changes, it is by no means the whole story. It is not only a household’s
income, but also their tenure status that determines the welfare changes they experience
as property markets adapt to localised environmental changes. They also demonstrate that
welfare outcomes are greatly influenced by the nature of the housing supply response to the
changing conditions resulting from a localised environmental change. Indeed, while previous
research has tended to focus on demand-side responses (Binner and Day 2015; Tra 2010;
Ferreyra 2007; Smith et al. 2004; Sieg et al. 2004), our work shows that supply-side responses
play a significant role in shaping the predictions ofwelfare change arising fromESManalyses.
2 Property Market Representations in Equilibrium Sorting Models
Early ESMs sought to shed light on the processes leading to the formation of cities (Mills
1967), themigration of individuals across communities (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1969; Ellickson
1971) and the segregation of populations across space (Schelling 1969). Over recent years,
the complexity of ESMs and the range of applications in which they have been applied has
expanded rapidly (Kuminoff et al. 2010). In particular, ESMs have been employed in the
evaluation of policies relating to air quality (Smith et al. 2004; Sieg et al. 2004; Tra 2010),
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private school vouchers (Ferreyra 2007), urban sprawl prevention (Walsh 2007) and property
tax reforms (Binner and Day 2015).Meanwhile, recent methodological papers have extended
the literature by seeking to address moving costs (Kuminoff 2009; Bayer et al. 2009; Epple
et al. 2010; Ferreira 2010), dual market decisions (Kuminoff 2011) and dynamic optimisation
(Fernandez and Rogerson 1998; Epple and Ferreyra 2008; Epple et al. 2010).
Despite very considerable advances, numerous fundamental aspects of choice in prop-
erty markets remain unexplored. One rather significant but widely-maintained assumption
adopted by the vast majority of ESM analyses is that all households are renters (Fernandez
and Rogerson 1998; Sieg et al. 2004; Klaiber and Phaneuf 2010). Epple and Platt (1998)
explore an ESMwith renters and owners, but within their model tenure status is exogenously
determined and the tenure distinction is incidental to the paper’s central focus on income sort-
ing across neighbourhoods. Of course, tenure status is not exogenous but rather the subject
of active choice. Indeed, empirically it is well-documented that that self-selection process
leads to marked differences in the characteristics of households in different tenure groups; for
example, owners have been observed to be wealthier (Dietz 2003; Dietz and Haurin 2003),
have improved health (Rohe and Leslie 1996; Rohe et al. 2001) and have higher-achieving
children (Green and White 1997; Haurin et al. 2002).
There are good reasons to suspect that tenure has a very important role to play in under-
standing the welfare implications of local changes in environmental quality. Imagine, for
example, a localised improvement in the environment that increases the desirability of a
neighbourhood, putting upward pressure on local property prices and rents. For homeowners
the outcome is unequivocally good. Not only do they get to enjoy an improved neighbour-
hood but they also benefit from the appreciating value of their home. Realising their capital
gains by selling their property might enable them to achieve greater welfare by moving to a
previously unaffordable larger property in some other neighbourhood. Renters, on the other
hand, find that the benefit they enjoy from an improved environment is immediately offset by
increases in their rents. What is more, since self-selection leads to income-sorting in tenure,
these differential impacts on renters and owners may well have important distributional
implications.
A second area worthy of consideration concerns the way in which ESMs handle housing
supply. The usual practice is to assume that housing can be defined as a homogeneous
good that can be purchased at a constant per unit price within a neighbourhood (Epple and
Romer 1991; Epple and Platt 1998; Bayer et al. 2004; Epple et al. 2001; Ferreyra 2007). In
effect, households “assemble” a property in their preferred location by buying-up units of
the housing good. The quantity of housing units purchased by a household can be thought
of as approximating real life choices over the size and quality of housing. At a given price,
if a household reduces their consumption of housing units then their total expenditure on
housing falls. Likewise, households can increase the number of housing units they consume
but will have to spend more on housing. One justification for this approach is based on Sieg
et al. (2002) who demonstrated that when housing enters the utility function through a sub-
function that is homogeneous degree one, it is possible to construct a “housing quantity”
index tantamount to an empirical analogue to the homogeneous housing unit.
Within ESMs the standard approach is to consider a housing supply function in which the
number of units available within a neighbourhood is non-declining in the per unit housing
price.Of course, the nature of the supply response depends critically on the time horizon under
consideration. In the short term housing supply is likely to be highly inelastic; a fact which
motivates the conventional ESM assumption that the quantity of housing units remains fixed
in the event of changingmarket conditions (Epple et al. 2010; Fernandez and Rogerson 1998;
Epple and Platt 1998). However, that same conventional approach assumes that individual
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housing units can be traded-off, transferred between households, and reconfigured to create
new properties of different sizes and qualities. This means that while the overall aggregate
quality of the housing stock is unchanged, individual households are able to increase or
decrease the quality of the housing that they consume. In this regard, the standard approach
assumes that we can costlessly move for example from a neighbourhood of N households
each with a property offering X/N units of the housing index to a neighbourhood of N + 1
households each enjoying a property offering X/ (N + 1) units of the housing index. In other
words, new households can be accommodated within the current housing stock without cost.
We refer to this as costless repackaging. In reality, housing supply adjustments are achieved
through a combination of home improvements, depreciation, house-sharing, remodelling and
relocation. The housing supply function must capture the confluence of these activities in the
property market. The precise effect that this would have on the total number of quality units
is unclear but it is not obvious that dividing a property of N units into two would result in
two properties of N/2 units.
In this paper we address these shortcomings through an ESM that we describe in the next
section. That ESM introduces a choice over renting and owning, allows for households to
earn income from rental property in the economy and explores an alternative specification
of the housing supply function that better captures medium to long term supply responses.
In particular, it allows for (i) elastic supply such that more housing units can be constructed
but with increasing marginal costs (as per, Epple et al. 2010; Fernandez and Rogerson 1998;
Hallstrom and Smith 2003); (ii) a capacity constraint for the total quantity of development that
can occur within a neighbourhood and (iii) a cost associated with repackaging housing units.
Capturing those realities in the housing supply function makes a substantive difference to the
patterns of market adjustment predicted by an ESM. Our paper challenges ESM analysts to
consider more deeply the implications of the standard, mathematically-convenient supply-
side assumptions.
3 The Model
The ESM used in this research is a development of that first described in Binner and Day
(2015), where a model which endogenised tenure choice was used to explore the impacts of
reforms of US taxation policies concerning mortgage interest payments. In this section, we
outline the key elements of that model and the extensions developed for this research, though
we delay explicit description of those extensions until we come to examine their impacts in
the simulation exercise described in Sect. 5.
3.1 The Economy
We imagine a set of households indexed i = 1, . . . , I living in a geographic region divided
into a set of spatially discrete neighbourhoods, j = 1, . . . , J . Each neighbourhood differs
in its residential desirability according to differences in the levels of K local public goods,{
g j,1, g j,2, . . . , g j,K
}
. Households are also heterogeneous and differ in their incomes, y,
preferences for quantity of housing, β, and preferences for homeownership, θ . Preferences
for homeownership are motivated by a number of factors including ideology, social status,
perceived stability, and expectations over future house prices.1 The distribution of household
types across the population is defined by the joint multivariate density function, f (y, β, θ).
1 It is possible to extend the model to allow preferences for homeownership to evolve over time, for example
as households mature, and are influenced by experiences including previously ownership and house prices
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The economic problem we explore concerns demand and supply decisions in this economy’s
property market.
3.2 The Demand Side
Households’ property market decisions have a number of dimensions. First, the discrete
choices of location and tenure where the location choice is between the J neighbourhoods
(migration outside of these neighbourhoods is not considered) and the tenure choice between
the options of renting, R, and owning, O . Defining the set of tenure options as T = {R, O}
with elements indexed t , a household’s residential choice is identified by a neighbourhood
and tenure bundle, { j, t}. Second, households choose how much to spend on housing. Fol-
lowing previous treatments (Epple and Romer 1991; Epple and Platt 1998; Bayer et al. 2004;
Epple et al. 2001; Ferreyra 2007), housing is defined as a homogeneous good that can be
purchased at a constant per unit price within a neighbourhood, p j . As discussed in Sect. 2,
households “assemble” a property in their preferred location by buying-up units of the hous-
ing good, h; a characterisation intended to approximate real-world choices over the size and
quality of housing. The number of units demanded by household i when choosing to live in
neighbourhood j under tenure type t is denoted,
hi, j,t = h
(
p j , g j ; yi , βi , θi,t
)
∀i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J, t = O, R (1)
where p j and g j are respectively the unit property price and index of local public goods (to
be defined shortly) for neighbourhood j . As a result of the discrete nature of the choice, when
a household makes the residential choice { j, t}, we observe hi,k,s = 0,∀ {k, s} = { j, t}.
To become a homeowner, a household must take out a mortgage on which mortgage
interest, mi , is due. Differences in the mortgage rate across households can be interpreted as
representing differing abilities of households to secure a mortgage and bargain for cheaper
interest rates. Mortgage interest is paid only on the amount borrowed, which is equal to
the product of the loan-to-value ratio, δi , and the value of the housing purchased, p j hi, j,t .
Differences in the loan-to-value ratio are driven by differences in incomes and are included to
reflect households’ differing abilities to fund property purchases from their personal wealth.2




h (y, β, θt ) f (y, β, θt ) dydβdθt (2)
In a standard ESM households are all renters. Once we introduce tenure we must also
allow for the possibility of capital gains. Capital gains (or losses) occur when an owner sells
some or all of their housing at a price higher (lower) than the amount that it cost them to
purchase it. A further discussion of capital gains is provided in Sect. 5.2.
Footnote 1 continued
observations. In our case study application we assume that each household’s preferences for homeownership
are fixed.
2 In this paper we assume that the mortgage interest rate and the loan to value ratio are exogenous, however
it is possible to extend the model to endogenise them, for example by allowing households to use capital gains
to lower their loan to value ratio. We anticipate that doing so would serve to increase the welfare disparity
between renters and owners.
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3.3 The Supply Side
Our ESM examines the ramifications of a policy that results in a localised change in public
good provision. We assume that prior to the change the property market has achieved a long-
term equilibrium under the initial conditions. In that equilibrium, each neighbourhood j is
home to n0j households who between them demand H
0
j units of housing, where H
0
j is the
sum of housing demand from households choosing to rent and households choosing to own.
To model the property market adjustments resulting from changing market conditions,
assumptions must be made regarding the supply response of housing. A frequent assumption
in the ESM literature is that housing supply is perfectly inelastic (Epple et al. 2010; Fernandez
and Rogerson 1998; Epple and Platt 1998) such that the number of housing units remains
fixed at H0j ( j = 1, . . . , J ). While that may be an accurate description of the short term, our
interest is in medium to long-term responses in which it is reasonable to assume that housing
supply responds to changes in the neighbourhood property price, p j . Indeed, an alternative
assumption to be found in the ESM literature is a housing supply curve that passes through
H0j and is as increasing function of p j (Epple et al. 2010; Fernandez and Rogerson 1998;
HallstromandSmith 2003).Of course, that specification allows for the possibility of unlimited
construction of new housing units within a neighbourhood at increasing property prices, this
supply function does not capture the reality of spatially-constrained urban development. In
addition, the standard assumption in ESMmodels is that as the population of a neighbourhood(
n j
)
changes, the housing units within that neighbourhood can be costlessly repackaged to
create the properties demanded by the new residents. In the UK, towns and cities are space
constrained and empirically the elasticity of housing supply has been shown to be low (Swank
et al. 2002; Meen 2005). This affects the number of new properties that can be constructed
as well as the number of households that can be accommodated within an area in the short
to medium term.
Accordingly, our specification of the housing supply function contains two additional
elements. First a development capacity, Dj , that places an upper limit on the quantity of
housing units (h j ) that can be constructed in a neighbourhood (that is, h j ≤ Dj ). Second,
we include an element which captures the costs of repackaging housing units. That element
is an increasing function of the change in the number of residents in a neighbourhood,
n j =
∣∣∣n j − n0j
∣∣∣, and hence an indicator of the degree of repackaging required to create




p j , H
0
j , Dj ,n j
)
∀ j = 1, . . . , J (3)
3.4 Rental and Purchase Prices
In the model described here, we assume that the market maintains a single price for housing
units, whether those units are being sold for rent or purchase. Such an outcome would arise
as a result of arbitrage activities if buyers and sellers experience identical costs in both
ownership and rental markets, and provided the owners or constructors of housing units face
no restrictions as to the sector intowhich they can supply their property. The decision tomodel
rental and purchase prices as being identical within a neighbourhood was driven by a number
of factors including (i) that properties in the UK can transition from being rental to purchase
with relative ease such that suppliers could increase their profits by altering the tenure of their
property if prices were not equal, (ii) that mortgage interest and loan to value ratios already
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drive a wedge between rental and purchase costs, and (iii) our calibration of preferences for
homeownership implies that not every household prefers to be a homeowner. In our model,
we assume that the price of housing units is inclusive of maintenance costs, which would be
included in the actual price charged to renters or anticipated as an unavoidable cost by buyers.3
A standard assumption in ESM applications is that the stock of rental properties are owned
by a landlord (or landlords) outside the economy to whom all rents accrue. An alternative
assumption would be to allow households in the economy to be owners of some or all of
the rental stock. When households are also landlords, changes in market conditions that lead
to changes in rental prices will have implications for household income providing another
pathway through which welfare can be redistributed through the property market. While
we experimented with models that allowed for rental stock ownership, the functional form
assumptions adopted in this paper (to be discussed shortly) preclude income effects of this
type. Accordingly in this paper we maintain the standard assumption of absentee landlords.
3.5 Government
In our model, the government’s role is to implement projects that impact on the provision
of local public goods.4 We also consider the impact of government interventions that seek
to compensate for damages resulting from such projects. The particular policy we seek to
replicate is that based on the UK’s Land Compensation Act 1973, whereby homeowners
are entitled to compensation for reductions in the value of their housing that result from
environmental damage generated by public works.
3.6 Local Public Goods
Households derive utility from the combined provision of local public goods, which is rep-





such thatγk is the weight placed on the kth element in g j . For simplicity, in the calibrated
simulation exercise developed in the following sections, we assume that each neighbourhood
provides just two exogenous public goods, g j,1 and g j,2, resulting in the following public
goods index,
3 In undertaking this research we experimented with other models in which we treated purchase and rental
sectors as independent markets with separate supply functions, an outcome that might arise if government
regulations prevented the transfer of properties between sectors. While we found a high degree of price
convergence between rent and purchase prices, not surprisingly we also found that assuming a different
structure to the property market altered predictions of the model. In reality, purchase and rental markets do
not exist separately, though the closeness of their interdependence is mediated by government regulations that
may restrict allowable tenure types and by differences in taxation and transaction costs encountered in the
two sectors. Ultimately, real property markets exist as some compromise between the two extremes of pure
arbitrage and independent markets. While our work suggests that the predictions of an ESM will be shaped
by assumptions regarding the interdependence of purchase and rental markets, we do not pursue that avenue
of research further in this paper. Rather, as will be evident subsequently, our focus is on the relaxation of
the standard ESM assumption that housing units can be costlessly repackaged and how allowing for more
sophisticated housing supply responses changes predictions of the distributional consequences of localised
environmental change.
4 This is not a restriction of ESMs in general which can encompass a variety of government interventions;
for example levying taxes, providing subsidies, funding expenditure on public goods, or setting production
standards.
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g j = g j,1 + γ g j,2 (5)
where γ is the weight that households place on g j,2 relative to g j,1. It is assumed that γ is
uniform across all households and between neighbourhoods, such that households agree on
the ranking of neighbourhoods in terms of the desirability of their local public good provision.
3.7 Household Optimisation
Households derive utility from local public goods, g j , housing, h, and other consumption, c.
Tenure status affects the utility enjoyed by a household from the flow of services provided
by housing. All else equal, household i derives the same level of utility from owning h units
of housing as from renting θ (h) units. For simplicity and clarity, households are assumed
to have the same preference for local public goods, α. Household utility is defined by the
function,
Ui, j,t = U
(
h, c; yi , α, βi , θi,t , g j
)
∀i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J, t = O, R (6)
The optimisation problem of household i can be decomposed into two stages. First, house-
holds calculate their optimal housing and consumption choices for each neighbourhood and









p j hi, j,t + ci t = R
(1 + miδi ) p j hi, j,t + ci t = O (7)










p j , g j ; yi , α, βi , θi,O ,mi , δi
)
t = O
∀ j = 1, . . . , J, t = O, R (8)
In the second stage, a household’s optimal residential choice is identified as the neighbour-
hood, tenure bundle, { j, t}, that provides the maximum value for (8).
3.8 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of themodel is defined by amapping of each household to one neighbourhood
and an associated vector of property prices, p = {p1, . . . , pJ }, such that;
• Each household resides in the neighbourhood that maximises its utility given the equi-
librium vector of prices, p, and public good provision, g.
• All housing markets clear,
HSj,t = HDj,t ∀ j = 1, . . . , J, t = O, R
The underlying properties that support the existence of equilibria in ESMs are unaltered by
the introduction of an endogenous tenure choice andpreferences for homeownership.Namely,
the single crossing, boundary indifference, ordered bundles and stratification assumptions are
sufficient to ensure the existence of equilibria (Epple et al. 2010; Epple and Platt 1998).
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4 Model Calibration
To explore the model, we developed a computer realisation of the ESM using the Matlab
programming environment5 making particular assumptions regarding functional forms and
parameter values. In essence, themodel is used to simulate the decisions of a set of households
predicting which neighbourhood and tenure option they will choose under particular market
conditions.
Themodel described in this paperwas developed as part of a research project carried out for
the UK’s Department for Transport (DfT). The particular assumptions made in calibrating
the model were designed to replicate a real DfT project; construction of the A27 bypass
around the town of Polegate in southern England. The project sought to achieve a high-
degree of realism by defining a multi-neighbourhood economy closely resembling Polegate’s
actual urban organisation (Binner 2012). To provide greater clarity in understanding the key
mechanisms that drive the complex array of adjustments that occur in the property market
following a localised change in environmental quality, the research recorded in this paper
reports on a simplified, two-neighbourhood version of the analysis. Accordingly, while our
simulations are rooted in reality, they are only a loose approximation to that reality.
In the following, we summarise the assumptions made in calibrating the two-neighbour-
hood model. The calibration draws heavily on the DfT’s Post Opening Project Evaluation
(POPE) A27 Polegate Bypass report (2009) which describes how the noise environment in
different neighbourhoods changed following construction of the bypass in 2002. To calibrate
the model to the situation prior to the bypass, hereafter the baseline, we draw on census data
from 2001 and data on property sales in Polegate over the period 1995–2012 to estimate
a hedonic property price model. As described below, the parameters of that hedonic were
important in calibrating the ESM. The hedonic price model was estimated using a spatial and
temporal smoothing estimator to account for changes in the shape of the function over time,
endogenous sorting and omitted spatial covariates.
4.1 The Economy
For the purposes of the simulation, the economy is divided into two regions; the town centre
and the suburbs. The town centre is closer to a range of amenities (whichmight include parks,
shops, schools etc.), however, they are also exposed to greater road noise as a result of traffic
that, in the first instance, passes through the town centre on the old main road (B2247). The
suburbs and town centre were defined as groupings of census tracts and, according to 2001
census data for those tracts, both neighbourhoods had approximately equal populations and
homeownership rates of around eighty per cent. As shown in Table 1, we take those as the
conditions characterising the baseline property market equilibrium prior to the building of
the bypass.
4.2 Property Prices
Following the method discussed in Sieg et al. (2002), baseline neighbourhood prices for a
unit of homogeneous housing were derived from the Polegate hedonic property price model,
estimated using a temporal and spatial smoothing estimator, as the neighbourhood-specific
intercepts for the year 2000. Those unit prices were higher in the relatively quieter suburbs,
£5258 per unit, than in the town centre, £5183 per unit.
5 The Matlab code is available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1 Baseline characteristics of the neighbourhoods
Town centre Suburbs
Population share 0.5 0.5
Homeownership rate 0.77 0.79
Average distance from centre (m) 400 1100
Road noise level (dB) 59 40
Price per housing unit (£) 5183 5258
Public goods index 36.9 38.0
Housing units per property Approx. 2.0 Approx. 4.1
4.3 Households
Household utility is represented by a Cobb Douglas utility function,
Ui, j,t = gαj θi,t (hi, j,t − ωt )βi c1−α−βii (9)
Household preferences for public goods, α, and homeownership, θi,t =
{
ωt , θi,t
}∀i, t , are
assumed to be independent of their income and housing expenditure. Notice that with a
Cobb Douglas utility function , βi can be interpreted as the share of income that household i
commits to purchasing housing. As such, expenditure on property remains constant provided
income does not change.
We drew 1600 households, replicating the number of households affected by the bypass
(Highways Agency 2009), from a joint bivariate distribution, f (ln (y) , β), of logged
incomes, ln (y), and preferences for housing, β. The parameters of the joint distribution
were estimated using the breakdown of gross weekly income and expenditures on housing
from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2001–2002. The resulting parameters were,
(
μln(y), μβ







where μln(y) and μβ are the means of ln (y) and β respectively and 	ln(y),β is the corre-
sponding variance–covariance matrix.
To calibrate household preferences for public goods, α, we use the technique detailed by
Carbone and Smith (2008). To implement that procedure we require estimates of willingness
to pay (WTP) for improved access to the town centre and WTP for reduced noise pollution.
We approximate the former using the implicit price of proximity to the town centre from the
Polegate hedonic model and the latter using the implicit price for noise pollution estimated
in Day et al. (2007). The calibrated value of α is 0.11.
In the absence of detailed information on loan-to-value (LTV) ratio by income group,
the LTV ratio was calibrated using data from the FSA Mortgage Product Sales Data Trends
Report (2007) which summarizes the proportion of homeowners in each LTV bracket. LTV
ratios (ordered from lowest to highest) were assigned to households (ordered from highest
income to lowest) and a mean zero random component was added to the loan-to-value ratio.
Preferences for homeownership, θi,t are normalised against renting such that,
ωt =
{
0 if t = R
0.02 if t = O
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1 if t = R
θi if t = O
where θi is drawn from a log normal distribution;






) = (0, 0.06) (11)
Both ωt and the mean and variance parameters, μθand σ 2θ , were calibrated using a maxi-
mum likelihood procedure that, as described subsequently, also established values for other
unknown parameters.
4.4 Local Public Goods
Neighbourhoods are differentiated by their distance to the town centre and road noise levels.
The local public goods index for neighbourhood j ( j = 1, 2) is given by,
g j = g j,1 + γ g j,2 + ξ j (12)
where g j,1 is (negative) distance from Polegate town centre and g j,2 is noise level in decibels,
dB. The proximity measure was calculated using ArcGIS as the average road travel distance
from properties in a neighbourhood to the town centre. Road noise was measured using the
average 18-h decibel level. Noise levels before and after the bypass in the two neighbourhoods
were calibrated using information from the A27 Polegate Environmental Statement (1991).
Following the same process as was used to calibrate the parameter α (Carbone and Smith
2008) we derive a value for γ of 0.02.
The public goods index also contains an unobserved element, ξ j (for j = 1, 2), which
serves to capture public goods that have been omitted fromour simplified specification. Those
unobserved elements of the public good were calibrated in the same maximum likelihood
procedure used to establish the parameters of the distribution of preferences for homeown-
ership. Given those values, the public goods indices calculated from (12) suggest that the
predicted level of public good provision is greater in the suburbs, consistent with the higher
property prices observed in that neighbourhood.
4.5 The Baseline and the Localised Environmental Change
The calibration exercise allows us to establish conditions in the property market in Pole-
gate before the bypass was built. Those conditions are summarised in Table 1. As we have
discussed, where possible, details of the two neighbourhoods including populations, home-
ownership rates, housing unit prices, road noise and proximity to amenities are taken directly
from data. Likewise details of the population including the distribution of income, loan-to-
value ratios and ownership of rental property are derived from empirical sources. Given our
assumptions regarding the structure of preferences empirical estimates of preferences for
housing, βi , preferences for road noise, γ , and preferences for public goods α can also be
estimated from data. As already indicated, the final step in calibrating themodel is to establish
values for unknown parameters. In ourmodel, those concern preferences for homeownership,
θi,t and ωt , and unobserved quality characteristics of neighbourhoods, ξ j . We establish those
through a maximum likelihood procedure that, given a particular set up to our model, seeks
values for the unknown parameters that match the model’s predictions of equilibrium condi-
tions most closely with the observed data in the baseline. Finally, the number of housing units
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demanded by each household, to form the property they choose in the baseline, is calculated
by solving for housing demand at the baseline prices using theMarshallian demand function.
Notice from Table 1 that road noise levels are higher in the town centre (59 dB) than in the
suburbs (40 dB). Properties in the town centre neighbourhood are, on average 400 m from
the centre of the town, whereas properties in the suburbs are an average 1100 m from the
centre. Using our derived value for γ of 0.02, the retrospective values of the public goods
indices are 36.9 for the town and 38.0 for the suburb.
The Polegate bypass constructed in 2002, directs through-traffic away from the city centre
along a bypass that skirts the town suburbs. The noise exposure of properties in the town
centre fell by 2 dB to 57 dB as a result of the bypass. In the suburbs road noise rose by 1 dB
to 41 dB (Highways Agency 2009). According to our calibrated model, those changes were
sufficient to reverse the ordering of the public goods index making the town centre a more
desirable residential location than the suburbs in terms of public goods provision.
5 Property Market Simulations
We use the calibrated model to explore the role of the property market and, more particularly,
modelling assumptions regarding the functioning of that propertymarket on the distributional
outcomes of localised environmental change. To do that, we present the results of a series
of simulations each of which is progressively more sophisticated in the way it represents the
property market and its response to changing conditions. In each case we begin by calibrating
the particular property market representation to the data in Table 1 to establish property
market conditions and household residential choices in the baseline. Subsequently, the model
simulates households’ location and tenure choices under the changed conditions resulting
from the bypass construction, using iterative techniques to identify a new set of prices that
achieve equilibrium in the property market (Lagarias et al. 1998).6 We begin by introducing
the standard property market characterisation in Sect. 5.1 and introduce endogenous tenure
choice in Sect. 5.2. In Sects. 5.3 and 5.4 we address housing supply constraints and include
fixed transaction costs associated with moving house, hereafter moving costs. A range of
alternative moving costs were explored, however, for the sake of brevity and because that
feature of property markets has been studied elsewhere (Kuminoff 2009; Bayer et al. 2009;
Epple et al. 2010; Ferreira 2010), we confine further details to the online supplementary
information in Appendix B.
5.1 Standard Property Market Characterisation (SESM)
Webegin by examining a simulation that adopts the standard propertymarket characterisation
used in the ESM literature. In thismodel, all households are renters and the number of housing
units in each neighbourhood is fixed but, in response to changing conditions, those units can
be costlessly repackaged to create new properties of different sizes. The demographics of the
two neighbourhoods derived from calibrating this model to baseline conditions are presented
in Table 2.
A number of sorting patterns are evident. First, households with higher incomes tend to
locate in the suburbs. Attracted by the higher provision of public goods, these households
6 The simulations were run multiple times using both pre-bypass prices and randomly selected initial price
vectors for the algorithm in order to check for the existence of multiple equilibria. In each simulation the
results converge to a single equilibrium. Although this does not prove uniqueness of the equilibrium it is an
encouraging result.
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Population share 0.5 0.5
Population characteristics
Mean income 57,528 84,647
Mean β 0.36 0.10
compete up the price of properties in this neighbourhood. Second, poorer households, who
spend a larger proportion of their income on housing, are attracted to the town centre by its
relatively low property prices. Likewise, those preferring properties with more housing units,
as captured by the preference parameter βi , tend to locate in the town centre where property
is cheaper.
The conventional, partial equilibrium (PE) approach to project appraisal identifies the
costs and benefits of the changes in the noise environment as the welfare impacts immediately
experienced by the households under their baseline residential choices.7 The top panel of
Table 3 summarises welfare measures from the PE analysis, reporting the average welfare
change experienced by renters in the two neighbourhoods and the total welfare change for the
bypass project. Benefitted by the fall in road traffic noise, residents of the city centre enjoy
substantial welfare gains. The opposite is true for those in the suburbs who lose welfare as a
result of their greater exposure to traffic noise. Since the partial analysis does not allow for
property market adjustments either in prices or residential location choices, the aggregate
welfare impacts it predicts is simply the benefits realised by the town centre residents net
the losses experienced by residents of the suburbs; an overall welfare gain of £81,461. For a
policy maker interested in the distributional consequences of the scheme the story is pretty
straightforward. According to the PE analysis welfare gains flow exclusively to households in
the town centre. Since those households are generally poorer than households in the suburbs,
the bypass construction project appears progressive in nature.
The general equilibrium (GE) analysis provided by ESMs allow for the possibility that
households will respond to the environmental quality changes by changing their choices in
the property market. In that case, the compensating variation measure of welfare change is
defined as










In the standard propertymarket representationwhen all households are renters, the quantity
in (15) depends solely on a household’s baseline choice of location, j0 and that made in the
equilibrium that arises after the bypass is complete, j1. In subsequent simulations we will
examine how things change when households also select tenure in the baseline, t0, and in
the post-intervention equilibrium, t1. The specific form for household welfare changes in the
GE analysis is given by,





















7 For interested readers, the partial equilibrium equation for compensating variation has been provided in
Appendix A in the online supplementary information.
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Table 3 Standard ESM—welfare outcomes from bypass construction
Town centre Suburbs
Partial equilibrium (£)
 Household welfare (mean) 382.95 −279.46
(SD) (926.26) (712.76)
 Household welfare (total) 81,461
 Rents to absentee landlords 0
 Aggregate welfare 81,461
General equilibrium (£)
 Household welfare (mean) 201.66 310.63
(SD) (498.51) (806.51)
 Household welfare (total) 410,050
 Rents to absentee landlords 0








is an endowment effect caused by property price changes for exist-
ing owners and π1i represents realised capital gains following the project. The treatment of
capital gains in the model is discussed in Sect. 5.2 (see Eq. 17).
Summary statistics for the welfare outcomes of the Standard Equilibrium Sorting Model
(SESM) analysis are presented in the bottom panel of Table 3. Although the analysis allows
for property market adjustments, a first thing to note is that the total rental revenues flowing
to absentee landlords remain unchanged. That finding follows from our use of a Cobb–
Douglas preference function; a function which imposes the assumption that households
spend a constant proportion (βi ) of their income on housing. While the quantity of housing
units purchased by households may change as rental prices adjust, the total amount spent on
housing and hence the total revenue to absentee landlords remains constant.
Things are somewhat different with regards to household welfare changes. To facilitate
comparison acrossmodels, thosewelfare outcomes are summarised according to households’
initial residential choices; for example, the welfare outcomes listed under town centre are
those experienced by households that chose to live in the town centre in the baseline even
if they decided to move to the suburbs after the bypass was built. Observe that the total
welfare benefits that the SESM analysis predicts will accrue to households are some five
times larger than those suggested by the PE analysis; a result we might expect given that
the GE analysis allows households to respond to the changed circumstances in ways which
optimise their welfare. Notice also that there are significant differences in the distribution of
welfare changes. According to the GE analysis renters in the town centre fare much worse
than predicted by the PE analysis. At the same time, renters in the suburbs, who experienced
large welfare losses under the PE analysis, are shown by the SESM analysis to realise welfare
gains.
To better understand how these differences between the analyses arise, consider Table 4
which describes the standard ESM’s prediction of the characteristics of the equilibrium
established after the bypass was built.
As a result of reductions in traffic noise, the town centre now provides superior levels of
public goods. Consequently, demand for property in the town centre increases as households
from the suburbs seek to relocate to the newly improved location. Since this model assumes
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Table 4 Standard
ESM—neighbourhood
composition after the bypass
Town centre Suburbs
Price 5233 5149
Population share 0.78 0.22
Population characteristics
Mean Income 78,926 43,948
Mean β 0.16 0.47
Population movements
From Town Renters 441 357
From Suburb Renters 802 0
Population 1243 357
that supply is perfectly inelastic, property prices in the town centre are driven up while those
in the suburbs fall. Despite high town-centre prices, relatively wealthy households who had
previously rented in the suburbs now find their optimal choice is to rent in the town centre. In
the SESM analysis, this group avoid welfare losses by moving out of the area with reduced
environmental quality. Residents of the town centre fare much worse in the SESM analysis.
Given their relatively low income levels, increases in town-centre rental prices are enough to
drive many of this group out of that environmentally improved neighbourhood and into the
environmentally deteriorated suburbs.
Accordingly, while the PE analysis predicted that the lower income households in the town
centre would be advantaged by the environmental improvements in that neighbourhood, the
SESM analysis paints a somewhat different picture. In particular, we find that many lower
income households are displaced from the town centre by wealthier households moving in
from the suburbs; as shown in Table 4 the average income of town-centre dwellers increases
while that of suburban dwellers falls. As has been noted in previous applications studying air
quality improvements in the LA basin (Sieg et al. 2004), Toxic Release Inventory emissions
(Banzhaf and Walsh 2004) and the provision of open space (Walsh 2003), the standard ESM
presentation of the property market tells a very clear story of environmental gentrification;
residents of an environmentally improved area fail to gain the full benefits of those improve-
ments as a result of rental price increases that force them out of the area to be replaced by
relatively wealthy households from elsewhere. In our model while the PE analysis predicts
that those in the bottom quartile of the income distribution gain an average welfare change
equal to 0.26% of their income while the top quartile experiences an average welfare gain
of 0.08% of their income, the SESM analysis predicts that both the top and bottom quartiles
experience welfare gains of around 0.36% of income.
5.2 Endogenous Tenure Choices (TESM)
One rather significant assumption of the standard ESM characterisation of property markets
is that all households are renters. In very many locations that is not the case. In Polegate, for
example, over three-quarters of the population own their home (see final row of Table 1).
Following the work of Binner and Day (2015), therefore, we repeat the simulation exercise
but using the ESM described in Sect. 3 in which households choose both location and tenure
but maintaining the standard assumptions regarding absentee landlords and housing supply.
Allowing for homeownership introduces a further complication to the model; namely the
fact that homeowner’s can experience capital gains or losses if they choose to relocate follow-
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Population share 0.5 0.5
Homeownership rate 0.77 0.79
Renters Owners Renters Owners
Population characteristics
Mean income 26,610 63,233 84,672 87,953
Mean β 0.40 0.35 0.12 0.10
Mean θ 1.02 1.19 1.00 1.18
Population 184 610 172 634
ing a change of property prices in their neighbourhood. For an existing homeowner the model
accounts for three ways in which capital gains or losses can accrue; (i) when a homeowner
sells some but not all of their housing units and stays in the same neighbourhood and (ii)
when a homeowner sells their housing in one neighbourhood and becomes an owner in a dif-
ferent neighbourhood, and (iii) when a homeowner sells their housing in one neighbourhood
and becomes a renter. Accordingly, in the endogenous tenure ESM the budget constraint for








= (1 + δimi ) p0j h0i, j0,O + c1 if selling as an owner
yi +
[




= (1 + δimi ) p1k h1i,k1,O + c1 if moving as an owner
yi +
[




= p1k h1i,k1,R + c1 if moving to renting
(15)
Where the terms on the left are income and those on the right are expenditure, superscript
0 denotes a baseline choice and 1 denotes a choice made at the post-intervention equilibrium.
In each equation the second expression on the left hand side denotes the capital gains or losses
made on units of housing sold and the first expression on the right hand side represents the
new expenditure on housing. Note that in this equilibrium sorting model households derived
utility from their consumption of housing and other goods, there is no utility affect from
an increase in the value of housing stock unless units are sold. Alternative models that link
utility directly to changes in asset value could be specified (as in Bayer et al. 2016), however
it is the authors’ opinion that the current specification is in line with real-world household
preferences.
Table 5 presents details of the baselinewhen calibrated to the endogenous tenure ESM.The
patterns of sorting are not dissimilar to those observed in the standard ESMbaseline (Table 2);
households with relatively lower incomes and higher preferences for larger properties tend
to locate in the relatively cheaper town centre. In addition, however, we observe sorting
across tenure options. Compared to owners, renters tend to have relatively lower incomes
and, not surprisingly, households with relatively high preferences for homeownership, θi ,
tend to choose ownership over renting.
Importantly, the introduction of tenure into the model results in significant differences in
the pattern of welfare changes experienced by households following the construction of the
bypass. Those welfare outcomes are reported in Table 6. As previously, the data is organised
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Table 6 Endogenous tenure ESM—welfare outcomes from bypass construction
Town centre Suburbs
Renters Owners Renters Owners
 Household welfare (mean) 45.43 536.13 202.19 −57.33
(SD) (97.21) (1574.00) (601.20) (397.33)
 Household welfare (total) 333,830
 Rents to absentee landlords 0
 Payments to mortgage lenders 2909
 Aggregate welfare 336,739
by a household’s initial choice of location and tenure. The most notable pattern in the data
is the sharp distinction in outcomes as a consequence of initial tenure status. While both
homeowners and renters originally located in the town centre are, on average, advantaged
by the construction of the bypass it is clear that the gains for homeowners are substantially
larger than those for renters. For those originally located in the suburbs the contrast is even
more distinct. While renters gain significantly from the environmental changes, those that
originally owned property in the suburbs experience welfare losses.
The property market adjustments that underpin those welfare outcomes are summarised
in Table 7. As with the standard ESM, property prices in the town centre are driven up as
households from the suburbs seek to move out of the environmentally deteriorated suburbs
to the environmentally improved town centre. Those increased prices have very different
impacts on the town centre residents depending on their tenure status. For many renters the
increased prices offset the benefits of the environmental improvement such that a majority
choose to relocate to the now cheaper suburbs. In contrast, the increase in property prices is
nothing but good news for homeowners in the town centre. Such households can remain in
the town centre gaining welfare from the environmental improvements or they can sell-up
and use the capital gains from the sale to buy a larger property in the suburbs. For 5% of
those relatively low income homeowners the latter possibility proves optimal. Either way,
homeowners in the town centre can only be advantaged by the changes they experience, a
very different outcome to that suggested by the standard ESM model. Tenure status also
determines the options open to the relatively wealthy households in the suburbs. For renters
many now find that moving away from the environmentally deteriorated suburbs to rent in the
town centre is their best option, despite the higher prices. For many suburban homeowners, a
move to the town centre also looks appealing though the gains from such amove aremitigated
by the capital losses they suffer in selling their homes at the reduced suburban prices. Indeed,
for roughly half of the suburban homeowners continuing to reside in the environmentally
deteriorated suburbs turns out to be the better option. Of course, those that stay put may take
advantage of the lower prices and offset their losses by moving to a relatively larger house
in the suburbs. All the same, the overall outcome for the majority of suburban residents that
own their home is a loss of welfare. Again, that is a distinctly different conclusion to the
story told by the standard ESM treatment in which the suburban group are those that benefit
most from the changes.
Notice also from Table 7, that despite many households choosing to change location,
none choose to change tenure status. Indeed, that observation follows from the assump-
tions of our model. Since rental and purchase prices are identical within neighbourhoods,
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Table 7 Endogenous tenure
ESM—neighbourhood
composition after the bypass
Town centre Suburbs
Price 5280 5165
Population share 0.69 0.31
Homeownership rate 0.82 0.68
Renters Owners Renters Owners
Population characteristics
Mean Income 81,668 81,719 21,203 60,427
Mean β 0.13 0.25 0.42 0.16
Mean θ 1.00 1.19 1.02 1.19
Population movements
From Town Renters 25 0 159 0
From Town Owners 0 581 0 29
From Suburb Renters 172 0 0 0
From Suburb Owners 0 319 0 315
Population 197 900 159 344
and preferences for homeownership, θi,t , are in no way dependent on the level of pro-
vision of the public good, g j , a household’s preferences for owning or renting will
not switch no matter what the change in level of public good provision they experi-
ence. Moreover since households spend a constant proportion of their fixed income on
property and all those that rented before the intervention continue to rent afterwards, it
follows that revenues to absentee landlords are not changed by the property market adjust-
ments.
Figure 1a and b plot out the outcomes predicted by the standard ESM and endogenous
tenure ESM respectively. The figures group households by their initial residential choices
and present boxplots of the welfare changes each group experiences. The solid line within
each box represents the median value whilst the top and bottom of the box are the 50th
and 25th percentiles respectively; similarly the top and bottom of the dashed line are the
95th and 5th percentiles. The standard ESM anticipates welfare gains across both town
centre and suburban residents with the relatively larger gains being amassed by the wealth-
ier suburban residents through a process of environmental gentrification. The endogenous
tenure ESM illustrates the misleading nature of that narrative. Tenure status is fundamen-
tal to welfare outcomes in a property market. While renters in the town centre are indeed
disadvantaged by the process of environmental gentrification, homeowners are not. They
directly benefit from the rising prices that drive renters out through the increased value of
their home. In contrast, for relatively wealthy suburban homeowners a combination of a
deteriorated environment and the falling value of their home precipitates substantial welfare
losses.8
8 Appendix B in the online supplementary information presents results from the TESM with the inclusion
of fixed moving costs. The introduction of these moving costs creates friction in the market and reduces the
amount of relocation, which has a moderate impact on property prices. However, the results show that despite
this friction tenure status remains fundamental to welfare outcomes.
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Fig. 1 Box plots of welfare changes (£) for households grouped by initial residential choice. a Standard ESM,
all renters. b ESM with tenure. c ESM with tenure, moving costs and housing supply realism. d ESM with
tenure, moving costs, housing supply realism and compensation
5.3 Housing Supply Realism and Moving Costs (TESM+)
In the simulations discussed thus far we have assumed that there are no moving costs and
followed the standard ESM assumptions regarding housing supply, these are two important
sources of friction that play out differently through the property market (see Appendix B for
further discussion of the distinction between moving costs and repackaging costs). Moving
costs have been explored in previous studies, however the impacts of repackaging costs and
capacity constraints have not. Consequently, in this section we adopt a fixed moving cost
and focus on the impact of housing supply constraints. The fixed moving cost is set at 200,
approximately 5% of per unit property prices.9
While the standard approach to modelling housing supply is mathematically convenient
and can approximate certain forms of adjustment including such as depreciation and reno-
vation of properties, it does not adequately reflect the realities of accommodating changing
populations within a neighbourhood. In this regard, the standard approach assumes that we
9 A range of uniform and asymmetricmoving costs were explored.While thewelfare of individual households
is affected by these moving costs, these impacts are counteracted by the impact of property prices such that the
net impact on the distribution of welfare across renters and owners, in the town and suburbs is not (statistically)
significantly impacted, even for large symmetric moving costs (e.g. 20% of property price per unit).
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Table 8 Initial and post-intervention property sizes
Model Neighbourhood Mean housing units per property (SD)
Baseline After Bypass
Standard ESM
Town centre 4.17 (9.67) 2.67 (7.43)
Suburb 1.93 (6.09) 4.35 (10.19)
Tenure ESM
Town centre 4.01 (9.36) 2.91 (6.70)
Suburb 2.06 (6.58) 3.30 (10.66)
Tenure ESM—supply side realism and moving costs
Town centre 4.01 (9.35) 3.47 (7.24)
Suburb 2.06 (6.58) 2.39 (9.04)
can move costlessly for example from a neighbourhood of N households each with a prop-
erty offering X/N units of the housing index to a neighbourhood of N + 1 households each
enjoying a property offering X/ (N + 1) units of the housing index. In other words, new
households can be accommodated within the current housing stock without cost. We refer to
this as costless repackaging. Onewaywemight justify the costless repackaging assumption is
by imagining that all increases in the population are accommodated within a neighbourhood
by house sharing. Of course, the empirical reality is one in which we also observe significant
costly investment in the development of new single-household occupancy properties; be that
through the division and remodelling of the existing stock, through demolition and rebuild-
ing or through infilling. In this section we develop a housing supply function is designed to
better reflect that reality; that there is a real cost involved in creating an extra property in a
neighbourhood and providing that property with the principal facilities and essential service
connections that are required for occupation by a household.
One possible short-coming of standard ESM housing supply assumptions can be seen in
the changes in populations predicted by those models. Compare, for example, the baseline
population in the town centre of 798 households (Table 2) with that predicted by the standard
ESM at the equilibrium after the bypass of 1243 households (Table 4). The model allows
for an almost 60% increase in town centre inhabitants. Not dissimilar outcomes arise in
the endogenous tenure ESM’s described in the last two sections. In reality, the number of
households that can be accommodated in a spatially-defined neighbourhood is limited by the
number of new properties that can be constructed within that limited space or reconfigured
from the existing property stock. The manner in which the standard ESM assumptions allow
for this expanded population is illustrated in the top rows of Table 8. Observe that in the
baseline, the fixed stock of housing units in the town centre is configured into properties that
on average contain 4.17 housing units. After the bypass, that average drops to 2.67 housing
units. In other words, a larger population is accommodated by repackaging housing units into
new properties of increasingly modest size (in terms of homogenous quality units). Again,
the assumptions that lead to that outcome are questionable. First, one would expect that the
higher prices that accompany increased demand in the town centre would encourage some
expansion of the housing stock perhaps through infilling on previously undeveloped land.
Second, onemight expect that the process whereby housing units are reconfigured to generate
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new smaller properties would be associated with some cost; the more properties one wished
to configure out of a fixed number of housing units, the higher the cost of their supply.
To explore the implications of the standard ESM’s supply-side assumptions, we further
augment our ESM by specifying a housing supply function that adheres to the following
plausible assumptions; the supply function (i) is elastic such that more housing units can
be constructed but with increasing marginal costs, (ii) has a capacity constraint for the total
quantity of properties that can be accommodated within the spatially-constrained geographic
extent of a neighbourhood and (iii) includes a cost associated with repackaging housing units
to create properties of a different size.
Hsj = H0j + a
(









0 ≤ n j ≤ Djn0j
)
(16)
where n j and n0j are the new and initial population size of neighbourhood j respectively, H
0
j
is the baseline housing supply, a and b are constants relating to the price elasticity of housing
supply and the marginal cost of using housing units to construct a new property. The price
elasticity of housing was set to a value of 0.5 in accordance with empirical estimates (Swank
et al. 2002; Meen 2005). In the absence of empirical data upon which to define the costs of
repackaging housing units, we explored a range of values for b, the results were robust for
values ranging from 0.2 to 2, in the simulations presented below we set b to 0.5, implying
that a 1% change in the population imposes repackaging costs that reduce available housing
units by 0.5%.
Observe that housing supply is defined within the limits 0 ≤ n j ≤ Djn0j , where Dj
represents the maximum percentage increase in the number of properties (and hence the
population) that can be supported by neighbourhood j . For the purposes of our simulations,
Dj is set as a uniform capacity limit that constrains the development of new properties to
a maximum of fifteen per cent in each neighbourhood. The introduction of a fixed capacity
limit in the supply of housing units alters the nature of the housing market. When there is no
capacity limit property prices are able to adjust until the point at which demand is equal to
supply. However, with a capacity limit, reducing the price may lead to an increase in demand
but also to the total number of people demanding property in the areamay exceed the capacity
limit.10
While changing the housing supply function has no impact on the baseline (Table 5), as
shown in Table 9, the equilibrium that establishes after the bypass is constructed is somewhat
different. Observe that in this simulation the town centre capacity constraint, which in this
case limits that neighbourhood’s population share to 0.57, is binding. As a result prices in the
town centre are pushed higher than in previous models as wealthier households compete for
access to the limited number of properties that can be accommodate in that neighbourhood.
As can be seen in the population movements section of Table 9, the inflation of town centre
prices leads this model to predict a greater displacement of households from the centre to the
suburbs than in models in which capacity limits are not accounted for. Consequently, there
is an increase in demand for housing units in the suburbs, which tends to support property
prices in that neighbourhood despite the small fall in public good provision.
10 To solve the model when the capacity limit is binding it is necessary to determine how housing suppliers
decide which prospective buyers to sell to. We assume that subject to the market price per unit of housing in
the area suppliers of housing choose to sell (or rent) to households who are willing to purchase the largest
quantity of housing units from them until the population capacity limit has been reached. This process ensures
that the maximum number of housing units (up to the total quantity supplied in the market) are sold (or rented)
subject to the capacity limit.
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Table 9 Endogenous tenure
ESM with housing supply
realism—neighbourhood
composition after the bypass
Town centre Suburbs
Price 5375 5258
Population Share 0.57 0.43
Homeownership Rate 0.79 0.76
Renters Owners Renters Owners
Population characteristics
Mean Income 81,321 92,427 23,661 52,977
Mean β 0.34 0.30 0.16 0.13
Mean θ 1.00 1.18 1.01 1.19
Population movements
From Town Renters 159 0 25 0
From Town Owners 0 586 1 23
From Suburb Renters 32 0 140 0
From Suburb Owners 0 136 0 498
Population 191 722 166 521
These price effects have important and substantial implications for welfare changes, as
summarised in Table 10. The relatively higher prices in both neighbourhoods predicted by this
model result in an average welfare loss for renters initially located in both neighbourhoods.
In contrast, those higher prices confer gains to owners in the town centre and provide a
source of compensation for owners in the suburbs who in previous models had endured
capital losses. Consequently, the distribution of welfare gains and losses is transformed
once the housing supply adjustments are incorporated; with large losses accruing to lower
income renters and large gains to wealthy owners. Figure 1c plots the distribution of welfare
changes for each of the initial residential choice groups. Comparing Fig. 1c to b, it is apparent
that the introduction of a more realistic housing supply response leads to predictions of
property market adjustments that tend to further redistribute the welfare gains from the
environmental changes towards homeowners and away from renters. While the particular
pattern of welfare changes suggested by this model are, of course, dependent on the particular
conditions described by this simulation, the clear lesson is that housing supply responses to
localised environmental change are fundamental to the distribution of welfare outcomes
resulting from that change.
5.4 Compensation
In the UK, following public works that lead to a reduction in the value of properties, the
owners of those properties (but not the renters) are entitled to claim compensation under
Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. According to that policy owners of properties
in the suburbs that are exposed to greater noise pollution as a result of the bypass are legally
entitled to compensation equal to the loss in market value of their property. Importantly, that
compensation is paid according to the fall in price that would be expected for a property
in the absence of relocation and other property market adjustments, rather than the change
in price actually realised. Our intuition is that compensation policies of this type have the
distortionary effect of protecting homeowners against potential capital losses while pushing
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Table 10 Endogenous tenure ESM with housing supply realism—welfare outcomes
Town centre Suburbs
Renters Owners Renters Owners
 Household welfare (mean) −187.76 522.91 −78.47 −124.95
(SD) (305.8) (1568.0) (466.2) (404.7)
 Household welfare (total) 191,710
 Payments to mortgage lenders 6822
Moving costs 43,400
 Aggregate welfare 198,532
the burden of environmental degradation onto the rental sector. As a final exercise, we use
our enhanced ESM to consider the implications of a policy intervention relevant to our case
study location.
Following the procedure used to calculated Part 1 compensation claims, we incorporate a








∗ g j,2 ∗ h0i, j < 50
∂p0
∂g2
∗ g j,2 ∗ h0i, j,O if ∂p
0
∂g2
∗ g j,2 ∗ h0i, j ≥ 50
(17)
The level of compensation is calculated from the implicit price of environmental quality in
the economy in the baseline, ∂p0/∂g2.Multiplying the implicit price by the size of the change
in environmental quality, g j,2, and then again by the quantity of housing in a homeowner’s
property, h0i, j,O , provides a figure likely to resemble that which might be calculated by an
assessor attempting to estimate the anticipated change in value of a property as a result of
the public works. Following the 1973 Compensation Act the minimum level of value change
eligible for compensation is £50.
Again, the relevant baseline is given in Table 5. Table 11 presents the prices and population
characteristics following the construction of the bypass. The largest compensation payment is
£6980. The receipt of compensation has little impact on the residential choices of households;
as with rental revenues, households tend to use the compensation to increase the number of
housing units and other goods that they consume. The influence of compensation is most
clearly visible in Table 12 and Fig. 1d, which summarise the welfare changes by groups.
Comparing with Table 10, on average, the payments more than compensate homeowners
initially located in the suburbs whose properties are negatively impacted by the new bypass.
As they do not receive compensation, most renters continue to experience a reduction in
welfare. Comparing Fig. 1d to c, compensation clearly alters the distribution of gains and
losses, broadening the division between renters and owners. In both neighbourhoods, the
welfare changes experienced by the majority of renters are negative while those for owners
are almost entirely positive. While the standard ESM predicted the lowest quartile of the
income distribution would gain welfare gains equivalent to a 0.26% rise in income resulting
from the change, once the role of tenure and compensation have been incorporated in the
analysis, these gains disappear giving way to average welfare losses equal to 0.5% of income.
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Table 11 Endogenous tenure
ESM with housing supply
realism, moving costs and
compensation—neighbourhood
composition after the bypass
Town centre Suburbs
Price 5376 5258
Population Share 0.57 0.43
Homeownership Rate 0.79 0.76
Renters Owners Renters Owners
Population characteristics
Mean Income 81,322 92,428 23,661 52,977
Mean β 0.34 0.30 0.16 0.13
Mean θ 1.00 1.18 1.01 1.19
Population movements
From Town Renters 159 0 25 0
From Town Owners 0 586 1 23
From Suburb Renters 32 0 140 0
From Suburb Owners 0 136 0 498
Population 191 722 166 521
Table 12 Endogenous tenure ESM with housing supply realism, moving costs and compensation—welfare
outcomes
Town centre Suburbs
Renters Owners Renters Owners
 Household welfare (mean) −187.76 522.92 −78.47 73.14
(SD) (305.8) (1568. 0) (466.2) (513.0)
 Household welfare (total) 317,300
 Payments to mortgage lenders 6851
Moving costs 43,400
Compensation (131,620)
 Aggregate welfare (net of compensation) 367,300
6 Concluding Remarks
The central objective of this paper has been to explore the insights that ESM models can
provide in predicting the welfare implications of projects that result in localised changes
in environmental quality. Currently, standard practice in the appraisal of such projects is
to establish the expected welfare changes experienced by those directly impacted by the
project using methods of non-market valuation that are nearly exclusively static in nature.
While correct in the short run, such PE analyses do not allow for the fact that households
may respond to an exogenous policy change through altering their residential choices in the
property market. ESMs provide one way of exploring those GE responses.
Our research suggests that policy appraisals based on PE analyses, ignoring the property
market’s role in reallocating access to public goods, are likely to significantly underestimate
the aggregate welfare impacts of a project and provide highly misleading information regard-
ing its distributional impacts. In our simulations, the PE analysis suggests that the project
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most greatly benefits the poorer households located in the improved town centre, a fact that
means that the lowest income quartile achieve welfare gains equivalent to a 0.26% rise in
income in comparison to a 0.08% rise for the highest income quartile. Once we account
for adjustments in the property market, even in a simple ESM ignoring tenure status, this
result does not hold. According to the standard ESM, wealthier households are able to exploit
their superior buying power in property markets to recover their welfare losses by moving
into improved neighbourhoods. The demand of these in-comers tends to increase property
prices in improved areas which, in turn, disadvantages the poorer residents of those neigh-
bourhoods. Ultimately, the standard ESM suggests that, in terms of shares of total utility, the
policy results in a situation that is no more equitable than in the baseline, in fact one which is
mildly regressive. Indeed the predictions of that model is that, on average, the lowest income
quartile experience welfare losses equivalent to a 0.5% reduction in income, whilst the top
income quartile benefit from welfare gains averaging 0.3% of their incomes.
A central contribution of the research in this paper has been to examine whether the nar-
rative of environmental gentrification suggested by the standard ESM is maintained when
greater realism is introduced into the model’s representation of the property market, for
example, in allowing households to choose whether to rent or own their property. The
endogenous tenure ESM we explore in this paper confirms that ignoring tenure choice
is a very significant omission. As anticipated, one of the key differences we observe
between renters and owners is that owners are more greatly benefited by neighbourhood
improvements. In particular, those improvements increase demand in the neighbourhood
and force up prices. Renters lose out when prices increase as their rents rise. Homeown-
ers, in contrast, gain from price increases through the escalating value of their property.
In contrast, in neighbourhoods that endure deteriorating environmental quality the oppo-
site pattern emerges. As demand falls, prices fall, saddling homeowners with capital
losses but renters with reduced rental costs. Accordingly, only one part of the story is
told by narratives of environmental gentrification. By ignoring homeownership, such con-
clusions fail to distinguish the crucial role of tenure in determining patterns of welfare
distribution.
Interestingly as we augment our model to capture more real world complexity, we see a
systematic switch away from the pattern of renters doing well when owners do badly and
vice versa. For example, when we specify a housing supply function that restricts the number
of properties that can be built in any one area, we find that constraint binding in the improved
town centre. As a result, prices in that neighbourhood rise steeply. Those price increases are
clearly bad news for renters currently resident in the town centre but they are also bad news
for renters living in the suburbs since they significantly reduce the benefits of escaping the
environmental deterioration in the suburbs by moving into the town centre. Moreover, when
we introduce a policy (modelled on real world analogues) to compensate homeowners in the
suburbs for the loss in value of their property we find a very different pattern emerges. The
GE analysis predicts that current homeowners generally benefit from the project while, in
the main, renters experience welfare losses.
While the emergent pattern observed in our illustrative case study is not generalizable,
the key insight provided by the simulations is that the manner in which an ESM captures the
mechanics of the property market has significant implications for its predictions of the distri-
butional consequences of policies resulting in localised changes in environmental quality. In
particular, our simulations demonstrate the pivotal role played by tenure choice and housing
supply response in shaping welfare outcomes.
Our work suggests a number of important areas of research that demand attention if
ESMs are to fulfil their potential in advising policy makers on the welfare implications of
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policies resulting in localised environmental change. First, ESMmodelsmust develop a richer
representation of the tenure choices available to households in the propertymarket.While our
work has focused on the core dichotomy of renting and owning, another significant option is
provided by tenancy in publicly-owned housing. Likewise, to truly capture the complexity of
tenure choices in property markets, ESMs will have to develop more realistic representations
of the financing options open to households in purchasing a property. Again our work has
made some advance in that direction, but there is much room for progress. A second key area
in need of further research concerns the representation of housing supply responses in ESM
models. We have shown that making a limited number of relatively plausible improvements
to the standard supply function used in ESM analyses has significant implications for the
model’s predictions, however our specification is calibrated but not estimated using empirical
data and fails to capture important realities particularly those relating to planning laws.While
our results show that supply side constraints and moving costs play a pivotal role in shaping
the distribution of welfare gains and losses, if we want to fully utilize these types of analyses
in advising policymakers, an investment in collecting andmaintaining rich datasets formodel
estimation in crucial.
Despite the limitations of standard ESMmodelling assumptions highlighted in this paper,
a simple truth remains: current reliance of policy appraisal on PE methods is fundamen-
tally problematic and can result in highly misleading predictions of the welfare implications
of local environmental change. ESMs provide perhaps the only tool through which those
problems might eventually be overcome.
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